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I.              Intro
It was a chilly Sunday, earlier this Autumn, when I lined up in a lengthy queue in front of the Museum of the
Warsaw Uprising in the Polish capital. I was in the company of my old friend and academic master Professor
Hans-Bernd Schäfer, who was visiting Poland those days. We spent roughly one hour moving slowly towards the
Museum’s admission. This reminded my companion of a story he shared with me while we awaited our turn. The
story was about a similar experience Hans-Bernd Schäfer had years earlier in Washington, where he once spent
even a longer time amidst American people lining up to pay a last tribute to the late William Rehnquist, Chief
Justice of the US Supreme Court, who passed away a few days earlier. A phenomenon unthinkable to this scale
in Poland and Germany alike, where citizens wouldn’t care to show up in crowds when a chief justice dies. But
what if the whole constitutional court would be to pass away?
II.            Background: State of the Republic AD2015
The recent tumult around the Constitutional Tribunal (Pol. Trybunał Konstytucyjny) in Poland involved two major
parties taking an unconcealed partisan stance and indulging into political rent-seeking, though with varying
revolutionary zeal, as this article seeks to evidence. But it wasn’t until the aftermath of the last election with the
power shift from the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska – PO) to the Law & Justice party (Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość – PiS) that the wrestling around the seats in the Tribunal arose to such a level as to make
headlines in Polish and international media. The alert has soon turned into a public outcry and SOS for
democracy in the heart of Europe.
Before getting down to the facts let’s have a brief disclaimer: freedom and democracy are so precious, in this
part of Europe, maybe more than elsewhere in the modern world, that one should never take them for granted.
But resorting to a narrative by which there allegedly was a downfall of democracy in Poland would go way too
far. As long as there is a freedom of assembly where people can gather and protest, express their views in the
most articulate way, what many actually do these days across the country, as long as the mainstream media
remain for the most part highly critical about the PiS orchestrated developments, as long as political parties can
turn the current crunch into their future electoral victories or suffer defeats for how they spark or handle the
constitutional crisis today – as long as all this is in place, any claim of a sunset of democracy in Poland is not
sufficiently substantiated and plainly exaggerated. And even worse, as it causes an inflation of words and
weakens the credibility of any future alerts should they ever become necessary. This also propels symmetrical
counter-narratives leaning towards various conspiracy theories to justify the hard stance of the newly elected
parliamentary majority vis-à-vis the Constitutional Tribunal as an alleged redoubt of the corrupted and indolent
ancient regime embodied by the former ruling party PO – a storyline many supporters of PiS want to accept.
Having said this, I do not want to downplay the gravity of the situation by any means. Quite the opposite: it all
may well be just a prelude to more serious inroads into the sacred sphere of civil liberties. All the aforesaid pillars
of democracy are to some extent contingent upon their legal underpinning in the form of constitutional
guarantees. Getting the Constitutional Tribunal out of the way may well be about the pursuance by PiS of salami-
slice strategy with further cuts ahead. So let the irregularities be called by their names and put in a proper
chronological order and the right political context.
III.         Setting the stage
Same as in a Shakespearean tragedy, the whole story to be told about the constitutional crisis in Poland, is
divided into acts. But unlike in a typical drama, where you usually have an evil character, a noble character, and
a tragic figure, and you may intuitively yet misleadingly be inclined to cast the government, the opposition, and
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the court in the respective roles, the constitutional crisis in Poland does deviate from this classic scheme. It is
rather based on a plot where everyone involved is to blame at least for a part of the calamity, and this includes
the Constitutional Tribunal itself. At least two of the acts of the constitutional drama were played before the Law &
Justice party took over. First, it is hard to deny the subtle impropriety of the involvement of three of the incumbent
justices in the drafting process of the new Act on Constitutional Tribunal and this well beyond a mere substantive
input – the records of the responsible parliamentary committee since 2013 onwards reveal that they were
actively pursuing the case down the entire road of the legislative process[1]. As valuable as the insiders’ insight
may be for working-out an efficient design of a legal framework under which the Constitutional Tribunal operates,
it is still difficult to reconcile the involvement of the incumbent justices with principles of Montesquieu’s division of
powers. It is not only about mixing the roles of the legislature and the judiciary, but also potentially by the
Constitutional Tribunal’s placing itself into a position of iudex in causa sua, if the Tribunal was ever to adjudicate
on the constitutionality of this new Act – a prospect that soon turned into a nagging reality. The incriminated
modus operandi also blurred borders between the judiciary and the executive. Here it must be recalled the close
cooperation of the Tribunal’s leadership with the then serving President of the Republic Bronisław Komorowski,
who formally launched the legislative process by submitting the draft Act to the parliament. What makes the
picture look even worse is the fact that the degree to which the justices’ determined the draft Act had long
remained shrouded by secrecy. The Tribunal’s Chief Justice proved reluctant to reveal to the public the proposal
for a draft Act and accompanying materials and it wasn’t until an NGO – a civil society transparency
organisation[2] forced this disclosure by defeating the Constitutional Tribunal before the Supreme Administrative
Court[3]. And this happened not to be an isolated incident, as shortly thereafter resorting to strategic litigation
has again proved necessary for civic activists to obtain information on service contracts concluded by the
Tribunal with various experts and on cash-flows resulting thereof[4]. A Constitutional Tribunal found being in
breach of public law[5] and neglecting civic rights, to which protection it is bound, is a notable development in
itself signalling both the good and the bad. The bad is obvious, the good is the ultimate prevalence of the rule of
law over the sense of solidarity among the judiciary. This is just a part of the background story, by no means an
excuse to how the situation around the Tribunal recently tapered. But still it can be seen as an alibi for the new
ruling party to step in. And in fact, not the only pretext for the current backlash. A much stronger alibi was
recklessly delivered by the former ruling party Platforma and their allied former President Komorowski. The
trigger of the crisis and in fact the prelude to future tragedy started in 2013 and peaked in the summer of 2015.
IV.          Prelude
In 2013 the former President of Poland Bronisław Komorowski put forward the aforementioned draft Act,
produced in close cooperation with the justices of the Constitutional Tribunal, if not solely by the latter. To give
credit to their job one must acknowledge that the draft contained important improvements with regard to the
selection procedure of future justices intended to raise the quality of the panel and weakening the political
influence of the Courts’ makeup. The proposed enhancements included a revolving-door sort of limitations to be
imposed on politicians craving to switch seats and don a robe. It also contained provisions designed to empower
the peer-review of potential justices by extending the nomination right to the academia and legal profession with
a view of further decoupling the Tribunal from the realm of political greed. However, most of the proposed
improvements have been eventually dropped along the legislative path in the PO-controlled Sejm. Instead,
towards the end of the term in office of the former parliament, a new, controversial provision suddenly popped
up. The new provision, technically a transitional one, entitled the departing majority to a last-minute appointment
of up to five replacement judges including two seats that were to become vacant long after the newly elected
parliament was to assume its duty. The official rationale behind the advancement of the appointments as
chronicled in the parliamentary records invoke an unfortunate coincidence of the successions to take place
around the same time both in the parliament and in the Constitutional Court[6]. But concerns about the
constitutionality of the “transitional” Article 137 of the new Act became apparent ever since the cunning idea of
appropriating the power to select beyond the parliaments’ term in office germinated[7]. Notwithstanding the
objections by the then opposition party Law & Justice (PiS)[8], the reigning coalition of the Civic Platform (PO)
and the Polish People’s Party (PSL) backed by the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) pushed the
law through, in a procedure that seemed hasty by yesterday’s standards but has soon turned to appear sluggish
by the standards of today as infamously set by the new majority party PiS. The outgoing President Komorowski
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signed the controversial Act on July 21st, 2015 – one of his last days in office. Soon thereafter it became binding
law (promulgated on July 30th, 2015 and entered in force 30 days later). To give an accurate account of the facts,
it needs to be emphasised that the said Article 137 was not a part of the initial draft as worked out at the
Constitutional Tribunal and it was crafted by politicians only at the final stage of the legislative process. The
judges participating in the legislative process never supported this provision but there is no evidence of their
opposition thereto either, in spite of their attendance of parliamentary committee’s sittings[9].
Based on the controversial transitional provision – Article 137 of the new Act, an advance selection of all five
replacement judges, one-third of the total makeup of the Tribunal, took place on October 8th, 2015 during the
very last sitting of the outgoing Sejm. In fact all five retiring judges were to step down after the scheduled election
date (October 25th, 2015), so if the first sitting of the new parliament had been summoned just a few days earlier,
immediately after the promulgation of the election results, all the five appointments[10] would have become
effective outside of the former Sejm’s term of office[11]. Eventually, with the first sitting on November 12 th, 2015,
it ended up with two (out of five) new justices scheduled to commence their terms already well after the new
Sejm took over. However, Andrzej Duda, a former PiS member and Komorowski’s successor in the presidential
office, took a less nuanced stance and delayed taking the oath from all five judges selected on October 8th,
2015. Admittedly, Article 194 sec. 1 of the Polish Constitution vests with the Sejm the sole power to select judges
of the Constitutional Tribunal, yet it is the president’s role to swear in the newly selected judges. President Duda
turned to procrastination, thereby deliberately uplifting a mere formality to a co-determination mechanism without
any constitutional basis therefor. The newly selected judges got trapped in the procedural deadlock and the
pending replacement process got frozen.
V.            Arsonists’ qui pro quo
On October 23 rd, 2015, just two days before the elections, PiS referred the Act to the Constitutional Tribunal
invoking its unconstitutionality on several counts. In particular it challenged the “transitional” Article 137. On
November 10th, shortly after victorious elections, PiS withdrew its own motion, hence the proceeding before the
Tribunal had to be discontinued. The idea behind soon became apparent: instead of resorting to a judicial
remedy, the now majority party decided to remould the law to their own needs by the tools they now have had at
hand: the legislative process. One week later, Platforma, who now switched sides with PiS and moved to the
opposition bench, put forward a motion to the Constitutional Tribunal to scrutinise the constitutionality of the Act,
before PiS would have a chance to change it. A genuine qui pro quo if you consider that the now opposition
party Platforma challenged the law pushed through by… the then ruling party Platforma. Political schizophrenia?
More likely, it was rather an opportunistically-driven U-turn resulting from PO’s change of perspective. What
makes the story even more of a tragi-farce is that the motion by PO was identical with the previous motion that
PiS first submitted (as the then opposition party) and subsequently withdrew (after becoming the majority party in
the newly elected Sejm).
VI.          Trading Shakespeare for Hitchcock
Right after the victorious election, PiS decided – through a coordinated action – to make a thinly veiled attempt
to subdue the Constitutional Tribunal. With the blatant support from Andrzej Duda, a former member of the PiS
and Komorowski’s successor in the presidential office, the new incumbents traded Shakespeare for Hitchcock by
starting with an earthquake followed by rising tension. The developments took a sharp and rapid turn. PiS
withdrew their motion for review of the constitutionality of the Act passed by the old Sejm. Not that they would
suddenly change their minds with regard to the substance. But the circumstances changed and so did the
interests. In the disguise of a guardian of the Constitution, PiS pre-empted the ruling by the Tribunal and decided
to push forward the amendments to the Act not via the constitutional review by the Tribunal but rather via
legislative process controlled by themselves. The reason for which PiS wouldn’t now want to see a judgement on
(un)constitutionality of the “transitional” Article. 137 of the Act was straightforward: the draft law to amend the Act
was already being elaborated with a twin Article 137a. On November 13th, 2015 the new draft law amending the
controversial Act saw the light of day. The pertinent Article 137 was to be replaced by a mirror Article 137a. The
later provision was designed with a view to reopening the selection process and refilling the five seats in the
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Tribunal, disregarding earlier selection by the old Sejm. The new law was adopted by the Sejm on November
19th, 2015, signed by President Duda on the following day (20.11.2015) and promulgated forthwith. Just to
remind: the same Duda hasn’t proved equally quick-reacting with taking oaths from the justices selected by the
old parliament, even though their term in office has already started to run. President Duda kept playing his
procrastination game until he eventually explicitly refused to swear in the five judges appointed by the old Sejm.
He argued that the appointment was based on an unconstitutional act – again putting himself into the shoes of
the Constitutional Tribunal.
VII.       The Tribunal’s self-defense and the twofold reincarnation of midnight
judges
On November 30 th, 2015 the Tribunal, sitting in full court[12], by unanimous vote, issued an injunction mandating
the Sejm to refrain from selecting or taking actions towards selection of any new judges until the Tribunal finally
decides the case on merits. The injunction was ordered with a view to prevent any developments that would
undermine the effectiveness of the pending constitutional review of the act. An unprecedented recourse to the
injunction[13] was received as a means of the Tribunal’s self-defense [14], yet it encountered spilt opinions[15].
Either way, the injunction manoeuvre, as the Tribunal’s ultima ratio, has soon proved toothless. The order
notwithstanding, the PiS controlled Sejm went unconcernedly on and late in the evening of December 2nd, 2015
selected five new justices – substitutes for the former replacement judges. In view of the blistering determination
of the majority it may be a mere subtlety to point to the fact that the “substitute” transitional Article 137a had not
yet entered into force at the time when the “substitute” replacement judges were hastily selected. For
Reconquista-obsessed majority a secondary issue at best. Immediately thereafter, before dawn on December
3rd, four of the five substitute-replacement judges were sworn in by President Duda[16]. The notorious “midnight
judges”, as the early 19th century eleventh hour appointments were referred to in the US[17], have in 21st
century’s Poland first reincarnated as the last-minute appointees of the old Sejm[18] and then reappeared in an
even more literal sense on the opposite end of the political argument as substitute-replacement judges selected
after the sunset and sworn-in before dawn.
VIII.     The Tribunal’s first judgement (3.12.2015, K 34/15) and the “Printer-is-the-
King”-obstruction
The following day, December 3rd, 2015, the Tribunal delivered a judgment on the constitutionality of i.a. the
incriminated transitional Article 137. In this regard – quoting from the English version of the official press release:
“[t]he Tribunal ruled that Article 137 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act is unconstitutional, insofar as the provision
made it possible for the Sejm, during its previous parliamentary term (2011-2015), to select two judges to the
Constitutional Tribunal in place of the two judges whose terms of office were to end respectively on 2 and 8
December 2015. By contrast, the provisions regulating the procedure for selecting three judges who had been
chosen to assume offices after the judges whose terms of office ended on 6 November 2015 were ruled to be
constitutional”[19]. With regard to the President’s refusal to take an oath from the legally selected judges, the
Tribunal held that the head of state was obligated to swear in the said justices forthwith. The Tribunal declared
any contrary interpretation unconstitutional, as it remains outside of the President’s powers to select judges to
the Constitutional Tribunal and the sole competence thereto is vested by the Constitution with the Sejm. As the
judgment of December 3rd sets forth, “any potential doubts that the head of state may raise as to the
constitutionality of legal provisions on the basis of which judges have been selected to the Constitutional Tribunal
may only be addressed by the Constitutional Tribunal”[20].
The judgment, as clear as it may legitimately appear, did not in fact contribute to the settlement of the political
dispute but met with further obstruction by PiS-dominated Sejm and stirred some legal procedural doubts as
well. Even though the judgement shall be final, universally binding, and irrebuttable (Article 190 sec. 1 of the
Constitution), it only takes effect from the day of its publication (Article 190 sec. 3 of the Constitution), and the
publication shall be made forthwith (Article 190 sec. 2 of the Constitution). Since however the official gazette is
administrated by the government, and the immediacy requirement, as one speciously could argue, isn’t a bright-
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line rule, the publication may theoretically be arbitrarily postponed. As absurd as this theoretical assumption may
appear, the practice has soon validated its premises: the government dared to refuse the publication and has
hence made the judgment virtually non-existent. Interestingly however, the government substantiated its refusal
by pointing to a formal deficiencies of the judgement: according to the Article 44(1)(f) of the Act on Constitutional
Tribunal, the Tribunal shall adjudicate in full bench if the case is of particular complexity or significance. Needless
to say, at least the latter undeniably holds true for the questions at stake. And it was the Chief Justice himself that
first ordained the case to be decided in full bench, as the statute prescribes. Only after it became evident that the
parties to the proceedings may request the recusal of the three judges who have previously been involved in the
legislative process (including Tribunal’s Chief Justice himself), the procedural order was amended so that the
case would be decided by a “default” panel of 5 judges. The amendment has not been duly substantiated, yet
the rationale behind it was obvious: an imminent threat of a deadlock in the Tribunal stemming from the former
involvement of three judges in the legislative process. Setting aside a valid legal point, namely the question, if a
pragmatic consideration (the Tribunal’s inability to adjudicate in full bench) could prevail over the statutory
formalities (the full bench requirement), one thing remains obvious: the ruling majority again attempted to pre-
empt the Tribunal’s exclusive power to finally resolve the pertinent constitutional issues. The government, by
abusing its auxiliary competence, or in fact its duty to act as an agent for the Tribunal with regard to a purely
technical matter, that being printing of the official gazette, endeavoured a superrevision of the judgment, without
having any constitutional basis therefor. For a third time in just few days the same pattern repeated itself: first the
president usurped the right to decide about the constitutionality of the selection by refusing to take the oath from
the judges appointed by the former Sejm, second the parliament pre-empted the Tribunal by changing the law it
opportunistically found unconstitutional in spite of a pending review process, and now, third, the government
refused to publish the Tribunal’s judgement on the grounds of its purported procedural irregularities. A sad spot
where the justices’ myopia (reckless involvement in the legislative process) meets the government’s
impertinence (harsh and unrestrained backfire). Eventually the government yielded and the judgment was
published on December 16th, 2015 – a long 2 weeks after the ruling. But it wasn’t until a new ace was ready to
come to play – a new amending act put forward by PiS on December 15th (cf. Section X infra).
IX.          The Tribunal’s second judgement (9.12.2015, K 35/15)
On November 9 th, the Tribunal ruled on the constitutionality of the amending Act of November 19 th, 2015, that
has been hastily pushed through by PiS and signed by the President just three weeks before. The amending Act
has been literally smashed by the Tribunal. The following amendments were held unconstitutional: (i) the
possibility of serving as the Tribunal’s Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice for two consecutive terms; (ii) the
provision, whereby the newly selected justices were to be sworn in by the President within 30 days after the
selection instead of being sworn in forthwith; (iii) the provision, whereby the judges’ term of office does not begin
until sworn-in by the President; (iv) the reversion of the appointment of the three judges as legally selected by
the former Sejm; (v) the annulment of the incumbent Tribunal’s Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice’ term in
office, i.e. their “downgrading” to a regular justice’s position or expiry of their presiding powers. Last but not least,
the Tribunal ruled unconstitutional the new substitute transitional Article 137a insofar as it concerns putting
forward a candidate for a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal to assume the office after the judge whose term of
office ended on 6 November 2015[21]. This confirms the legality of the appointment of the three (out of five)
replacement judges selected by the old Sejm, as ruled by the Tribunal in its first judgement of December 3rd,
2015.
The judgement’s publication in the official gazette was again unduly postponed by the government and
eventually printed on December 18th, 2015.
 
X.            Driving the final nail in the coffin?
The time bought through playing with the delay in publication (boxing) was used by PiS to develop a new
manoeuvre (chess). Namely, on December 15th, 2015 a new draft amending law has been put forward by the
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ruling party. Ironically the draft was heralded under the working title a “Repair Act on the Constitutional Tribunal”
as it was alleged to break out of the deadlock. In fact it contained a set of provisions to further entrap the Tribunal
and effectively paralyse it. The draft encountered wide criticism[22] for being both unconstitutional and ill-
designed. Notwithstanding the objections the majority party pushed the law through in a hasty process, curbing
the discussion and ignoring almost all corrections proposed by the opposition. Eventually the “Repair Act” has
been adopted by PiS in the night of December 22nd, 2015, against all other parties represented in Sejm. The
key provisions of the newly adopted “Repair Act” embrace[23]:
a broadening of the full bench requirement by a default provision stipulating that unless the Act provides
otherwise, the Tribunal adjudicates in full bench. This reverses the former approach whereby only in
cases specified by the law the Tribunal had to sit in full court. In practice, this may well jeopardise the
daily functioning of the Tribunal by making it incapable of handling future case-inflow;
raising the numbers of the full bench from 11/15 (now) to 13/15 (according to the “Repair Act”), whereby
the Tribunal becomes inoperative unless it immediately accepts the controversial and actually
delegitimized substitute-replacement judges selected by PiS and sworn-in by President Duda in
contravention of the Tribunal’s injunction of December 2nd (cf. Section VII supra) and subsequent rulings
of December 3rd and 9th (cf. Section VIII and Section VIII respectively);
imposing of a supermajority vote (two-third) requirement each time the Tribunal adjudicates in full bench –
in breach of Article 190 sec. 5 of the Constitution requiring just a majority (tacitly: a simple majority). The
supermajority requirement doesn’t arise accidentally as it nicely coincides with the new blocking stock PiS
will obtain in the Tribunal through their “midnight” appointees (substitute-replacement judges).
A part of the manoeuvre has been not to have any vacatio legis – the act shall become effective from the day of
its promulgation. This is to entrap the Tribunal in a vicious circle – the review of the new Act should be made in
accordance with this new Act and the Act makes such a review impossible. The only way out would be to refer
the Act to the Tribunal for constitutional review by President Duda before signing it (ex ante review). But will
President Duda this time around prove more loyal to the Constitution than to his former party? Alternatively, the
Tribunal may adjudicate based on the Constitution directly, paying no regard to the laws it finds unconstitutional
along the proceedings. But will the ruling majority accept the ruling and obey? After the chess round it has
always been boxing and they are the ones that have the punching power.
By the time of closing this article the newly adopted law has been referred for approval to the Senate – the upper
chamber of the Polish parliament – also PiS-dominated.
XI.          Conclusion and outlook
Undeniably, there is an unscrupulous political bout going on and the aggravating constitutional crisis is both a
result of the struggle and a means to prevail in the battle. The Socio-institutional underpinning of the crisis
should be seen in a poor constitutional culture among the leading political figures on both sides and in the
deepening Weltanschauung divide of the Polish society. Still, it wouldn’t give a proper account of the situation to
deny that other countries and other times have seen similar developments as well. Notably Hungary under the
Orbán administration has “successfully” marginalised the role of the Constitutional Court. In past centuries
constitutional arguments were also eating away at American politics and society at large, recalling Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s lost clash with the Supreme Court[24] or the aforementioned “midnight judges” dispute over
outgoing president Adams’s appointments rendered ineffective by his successor in presidential office, Thomas
Jefferson[25]. The prestige of the Constitutional Court and its power to interfere with the government’s policies
make it tempting to do both – take the seats in the Court as one more political bounty[26] and to neutralise the
possible adverse effect of the Court’s independence on the government’s latitude in pursuing whatever policies
or attaining whatever goals the government may wish. In spite of these two alluring prospects, never before in
the nearly 30-years’ history of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal has any party dared a Court raid and any
attempted manoeuvres were widely condemned and consequently nipped in the bud[27]. What makes the
situation look different today? Why would the ruling Law & Justice party strive to reform, or actually incapacitate
the Constitutional Tribunal? How much thereof is attributable to an affect-driven political vengeance and how
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much to a cool calculation? The “bull in a china shop”-like diplomacy speaks for the former, but it certainly is
more than just that. As Maciej Kisilewski convincingly points out, the weakening of Constitutional Tribunal may
well be a conscious attempt to pave the way for the implementation of the party’s social agenda. An analogy to
Roosevelt’s “court packing” is easy to discern. However, most of the promises made by PiS during the election
campaign fall within social policy and are thus to a considerable extent subject to sole discretionary powers of
the legislative and executive with little if any scope for judicial interference. But the reforming and reshuffling zeal
by the PiS leadership is not restrained to socio-economic issues as the first weeks of the new government
evidenced. As it was reportedly bluntly framed by an anonymous adviser to Polish President Duda “now begins
the process of reconquering the country, and it may be brutal”[28]. Media and civil service are among the first to
undergo far-reaching reorganisation. Given this broader scope, a development parallel to a Hungarian
“Orbánisation” does not seem a fully unrealistic prospect. And here we are back to democracy and to giving the
people what they want. The Budapest analogy[29] was not seen by the October’15 voters with dismay – many
appreciate Orbán’s uncompromising foreign policy and valiant domestic reforms. But soon PiS will arrive at a
check-point: do they deliver what they promised in the run-up to their electoral victories, first presidential in May
and then parliamentary in October 2015? No excuses accepted. And, putting aside the morals and aesthetics of
the party’s obdurate attitude towards the Constitutional Tribunal, let alone its legality, will this headstrong stance
prove in any way effective if measured by the degree of attaining of underlying policy objectives? Putting it
differently: will the Tribunal now turn more lenient towards the legislation produced by the ruling party? Even if
PiS proves eventually successful with installing its “own” five judges, which is still an unsettled issue, the
remaining majority may – as political analysts suggest[30] – humanly turn hostile towards a party that is blamed
for the coup. This subtle yet highly important issue could have been handled with a much more diplomatic touch.
Unfortunately for the Tribunal and for themselves, the new ruling party PiS, instead of demonstrating adherence
to the rule of law and searching for a compromise, decided to simply seek revenge for earlier irregularities by
Platforma, and attempt to subdue and eventually downgrade the Constitutional Tribunal, something that Poland
has not experienced in the last 30 years, since the establishment of the Court. And this certainly is deeply
troubling. So we are now watching a sort of chess-boxing, a hybrid game consisting of rounds in chess and
boxing, where the parties attempt to outsmart the opponent and if this doesn’t help, they simply punch.
Contravention of the division of powers and disregard for the idea of limited government has repeatedly been
perpetrated by the ruling party Law & Justice and “their” President Duda. It remains to be seen if the attempts
made are understood by the perpetrators as a tool to facilitate party’s short-term objectives or as an ultimate
goal to redesign Poland’s institutional order. For the latter it needs to be recalled that although PiS’s electoral
victory remains undisputed and gives the party a democratic legitimacy to pushing forward their reform agenda,
the majority won by PiS is not a “constitutional majority” meaning a supermajority granting the power to amend
the Constitution and the institutional order resting thereon. And here justice needs to be given to Orbán’s Fidesz
– who unlike PiS in Poland – democratically won the supermajority needed to revise Hungarian Constitution. In
spite of falling short of obtaining a supermajority, Kaczyński’s party now attempts to get there through dubious
by-passes trampling the rule of law and spoiling political and constitutional culture. But it is still more complex
than just to say that the incumbents strive for the marginalisation of the Constitutional Tribunal. It equally appears
to make a part of an attempted redefinition of elites and societal structure of post-socialist Poland, as defined by
the renowned Round Table Talks and accompanying negotiations that led to a bloodless transformation started in
1989.
In my view, the intensity and the nature of the crisis make it necessary to break a spell cast on the Tribunal. And
it is not just about the pragmatics, meaning the legal framework and the unsettled appointments controversy. It is
equally the symbolic power of the Tribunal that is at stake. Like it or not, the Tribunal has been severely hit and
“desacralized”. The popular esteem enjoyed by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, even if lesser in comparison
with the American Supreme Court or the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, is still remarkably high, which
becomes even more evident if account is taken of a positive gap in public confidence in the Constitutional Court
over the trust in general judiciary – a gap much wider in Poland than in Germany or the US, where the
confidence in the justice system as such does not fall that much behind the one in the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht or the U.S. Supreme Court[31]. And even I am far from idealising the quality of the
past jurisprudence of the Polish Tribunal, I do believe, the symbolic dimension of the Court is a value in itself[32].
Only a model legislative process, fully transparent and under the involvement of civic society and academia, with
their voices being heard, could remedy the situation and help with restoring public confidence in the rule of law
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and strengthen the legitimacy of the Tribunal after the loss in reputation suffered from the recent turmoil.
Paradoxically the fact that all the parties to the dispute are to blame at least for a part of the collapse, this not to
exclude the Tribunal itself, may be seen as a premise upon which a future cross-party compromise may be
based. But this is unlikely to happen without a durable pressure from the public and without the involvement of
civil society organisations taking an unpartisan stance and fighting for the cause, and not for politics. The
politicising of the current bottom-up civic resistance and attempts to take over the movement by active political
leaders will only aggravate the divide. Developments of recent days have shown that the people of Poland are
willing to go out on streets if justice dies. But they should not side with the former assassins. What is needed is a
cross-party understanding based upon constitutional values, not just interests.
The author would like to thank Dr. Marek Porzycki, Adv. Rafał Kos, Dr. Wojciech Rogowski and Prof. Charles
Szymanski for discussion and their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. All expressed views are
authors’ own, so are any errors and omissions. The author may be contacted at radwan@allerhand.pl .
[1] Cf. the documents and video-recordings of Committee’s and Subcommittees’ sittings 2013-2015 available at
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/SQL2.nsf/poskomprocall?OpenAgent&7&1590, in particular the report of May 12 th, 2015
of the special Subcommittee concerning the draft Act on the Constitutional Tribunal available at
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I.              Intro
It was a chilly Sunday, earlier this Autumn, when I lined up in a lengthy queue in front of the Museum of the
Warsaw Uprising in the Polish capital. I was in the company of my old friend and academic master Professor
Hans-Bernd Schäfer, who was visiting Poland those days. We spent roughly one hour moving slowly towards the
Museum’s admission. This reminded my companion of a story he shared with me while we awaited our turn. The
story was about a similar experience Hans-Bernd Schäfer had years earlier in Washington, where he once spent
even a longer time amidst American people lining up to pay a last tribute to the late William Rehnquist, Chief
Justice of the US Supreme Court, who passed away a few days earlier. A phenomenon unthinkable to this scale
in Poland and Germany alike, where citizens wouldn’t care to show up in crowds when a chief justice dies. But
what if the whole constitutional court would be to pass away?
II.            Background: State of the Republic AD2015
The recent tumult around the Constitutional Tribunal (Pol. Trybunał Konstytucyjny) in Poland involved two major
parties taking an unconcealed partisan stance and indulging into political rent-seeking, though with varying
revolutionary zeal, as this article seeks to evidence. But it wasn’t until the aftermath of the last election with the
power shift from the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska – PO) to the Law & Justice party (Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość – PiS) that the wrestling around the seats in the Tribunal arose to such a level as to make
headlines in Polish and international media. The alert has soon turned into a public outcry and SOS for
democracy in the heart of Europe.
Before getting down to the facts let’s have a brief disclaimer: freedom and democracy are so precious, in this
part of Europe, maybe more than elsewhere in the modern world, that one should never take them for granted.
But resorting to a narrative by which there allegedly was a downfall of democracy in Poland would go way too
far. As long as there is a freedom of assembly where people can gather and protest, express their views in the
most articulate way, what many actually do these days across the country, as long as the mainstream media
remain for the most part highly critical about the PiS orchestrated developments, as long as political parties can
turn the current crunch into their future electoral victories or suffer defeats for how they spark or handle the
constitutional crisis today – as long as all this is in place, any claim of a sunset of democracy in Poland is not
sufficiently substantiated and plainly exaggerated. And even worse, as it causes an inflation of words and
weakens the credibility of any future alerts should they ever become necessary. This also propels symmetrical
counter-narratives leaning towards various conspiracy theories to justify the hard stance of the newly elected
parliamentary majority vis-à-vis the Constitutional Tribunal as an alleged redoubt of the corrupted and indolent
ancient regime embodied by the former ruling party PO – a storyline many supporters of PiS want to accept.
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Having said this, I do not want to downplay the gravity of the situation by any means. Quite the opposite: it all
may well be just a prelude to more serious inroads into the sacred sphere of civil liberties. All the aforesaid pillars
of democracy are to some extent contingent upon their legal underpinning in the form of constitutional
guarantees. Getting the Constitutional Tribunal out of the way may well be about the pursuance by PiS of salami-
slice strategy with further cuts ahead. So let the irregularities be called by their names and put in a proper
chronological order and the right political context.
III.         Setting the stage
Same as in a Shakespearean tragedy, the whole story to be told about the constitutional crisis in Poland, is
divided into acts. But unlike in a typical drama, where you usually have an evil character, a noble character, and
a tragic figure, and you may intuitively yet misleadingly be inclined to cast the government, the opposition, and
the court in the respective roles, the constitutional crisis in Poland does deviate from this classic scheme. It is
rather based on a plot where everyone involved is to blame at least for a part of the calamity, and this includes
the Constitutional Tribunal itself. At least two of the acts of the constitutional drama were played before the Law &
Justice party took over. First, it is hard to deny the subtle impropriety of the involvement of three of the incumbent
justices in the drafting process of the new Act on Constitutional Tribunal and this well beyond a mere substantive
input – the records of the responsible parliamentary committee since 2013 onwards reveal that they were
actively pursuing the case down the entire road of the legislative process[1]. As valuable as the insiders’ insight
may be for working-out an efficient design of a legal framework under which the Constitutional Tribunal operates,
it is still difficult to reconcile the involvement of the incumbent justices with principles of Montesquieu’s division of
powers. It is not only about mixing the roles of the legislature and the judiciary, but also potentially by the
Constitutional Tribunal’s placing itself into a position of iudex in causa sua, if the Tribunal was ever to adjudicate
on the constitutionality of this new Act – a prospect that soon turned into a nagging reality. The incriminated
modus operandi also blurred borders between the judiciary and the executive. Here it must be recalled the close
cooperation of the Tribunal’s leadership with the then serving President of the Republic Bronisław Komorowski,
who formally launched the legislative process by submitting the draft Act to the parliament. What makes the
picture look even worse is the fact that the degree to which the justices’ determined the draft Act had long
remained shrouded by secrecy. The Tribunal’s Chief Justice proved reluctant to reveal to the public the proposal
for a draft Act and accompanying materials and it wasn’t until an NGO – a civil society transparency
organisation[2] forced this disclosure by defeating the Constitutional Tribunal before the Supreme Administrative
Court[3]. And this happened not to be an isolated incident, as shortly thereafter resorting to strategic litigation
has again proved necessary for civic activists to obtain information on service contracts concluded by the
Tribunal with various experts and on cash-flows resulting thereof[4]. A Constitutional Tribunal found being in
breach of public law[5] and neglecting civic rights, to which protection it is bound, is a notable development in
itself signalling both the good and the bad. The bad is obvious, the good is the ultimate prevalence of the rule of
law over the sense of solidarity among the judiciary. This is just a part of the background story, by no means an
excuse to how the situation around the Tribunal recently tapered. But still it can be seen as an alibi for the new
ruling party to step in. And in fact, not the only pretext for the current backlash. A much stronger alibi was
recklessly delivered by the former ruling party Platforma and their allied former President Komorowski. The
trigger of the crisis and in fact the prelude to future tragedy started in 2013 and peaked in the summer of 2015.
IV.          Prelude
In 2013 the former President of Poland Bronisław Komorowski put forward the aforementioned draft Act,
produced in close cooperation with the justices of the Constitutional Tribunal, if not solely by the latter. To give
credit to their job one must acknowledge that the draft contained important improvements with regard to the
selection procedure of future justices intended to raise the quality of the panel and weakening the political
influence of the Courts’ makeup. The proposed enhancements included a revolving-door sort of limitations to be
imposed on politicians craving to switch seats and don a robe. It also contained provisions designed to empower
the peer-review of potential justices by extending the nomination right to the academia and legal profession with
a view of further decoupling the Tribunal from the realm of political greed. However, most of the proposed
improvements have been eventually dropped along the legislative path in the PO-controlled Sejm. Instead,
towards the end of the term in office of the former parliament, a new, controversial provision suddenly popped
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up. The new provision, technically a transitional one, entitled the departing majority to a last-minute appointment
of up to five replacement judges including two seats that were to become vacant long after the newly elected
parliament was to assume its duty. The official rationale behind the advancement of the appointments as
chronicled in the parliamentary records invoke an unfortunate coincidence of the successions to take place
around the same time both in the parliament and in the Constitutional Court[6]. But concerns about the
constitutionality of the “transitional” Article 137 of the new Act became apparent ever since the cunning idea of
appropriating the power to select beyond the parliaments’ term in office germinated[7]. Notwithstanding the
objections by the then opposition party Law & Justice (PiS)[8], the reigning coalition of the Civic Platform (PO)
and the Polish People’s Party (PSL) backed by the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) pushed the
law through, in a procedure that seemed hasty by yesterday’s standards but has soon turned to appear sluggish
by the standards of today as infamously set by the new majority party PiS. The outgoing President Komorowski
signed the controversial Act on July 21st, 2015 – one of his last days in office. Soon thereafter it became binding
law (promulgated on July 30th, 2015 and entered in force 30 days later). To give an accurate account of the facts,
it needs to be emphasised that the said Article 137 was not a part of the initial draft as worked out at the
Constitutional Tribunal and it was crafted by politicians only at the final stage of the legislative process. The
judges participating in the legislative process never supported this provision but there is no evidence of their
opposition thereto either, in spite of their attendance of parliamentary committee’s sittings[9].
Based on the controversial transitional provision – Article 137 of the new Act, an advance selection of all five
replacement judges, one-third of the total makeup of the Tribunal, took place on October 8th, 2015 during the
very last sitting of the outgoing Sejm. In fact all five retiring judges were to step down after the scheduled election
date (October 25th, 2015), so if the first sitting of the new parliament had been summoned just a few days earlier,
immediately after the promulgation of the election results, all the five appointments[10] would have become
effective outside of the former Sejm’s term of office[11]. Eventually, with the first sitting on November 12 th, 2015,
it ended up with two (out of five) new justices scheduled to commence their terms already well after the new
Sejm took over. However, Andrzej Duda, a former PiS member and Komorowski’s successor in the presidential
office, took a less nuanced stance and delayed taking the oath from all five judges selected on October 8th,
2015. Admittedly, Article 194 sec. 1 of the Polish Constitution vests with the Sejm the sole power to select judges
of the Constitutional Tribunal, yet it is the president’s role to swear in the newly selected judges. President Duda
turned to procrastination, thereby deliberately uplifting a mere formality to a co-determination mechanism without
any constitutional basis therefor. The newly selected judges got trapped in the procedural deadlock and the
pending replacement process got frozen.
V.            Arsonists’ qui pro quo
On October 23 rd, 2015, just two days before the elections, PiS referred the Act to the Constitutional Tribunal
invoking its unconstitutionality on several counts. In particular it challenged the “transitional” Article 137. On
November 10th, shortly after victorious elections, PiS withdrew its own motion, hence the proceeding before the
Tribunal had to be discontinued. The idea behind soon became apparent: instead of resorting to a judicial
remedy, the now majority party decided to remould the law to their own needs by the tools they now have had at
hand: the legislative process. One week later, Platforma, who now switched sides with PiS and moved to the
opposition bench, put forward a motion to the Constitutional Tribunal to scrutinise the constitutionality of the Act,
before PiS would have a chance to change it. A genuine qui pro quo if you consider that the now opposition
party Platforma challenged the law pushed through by… the then ruling party Platforma. Political schizophrenia?
More likely, it was rather an opportunistically-driven U-turn resulting from PO’s change of perspective. What
makes the story even more of a tragi-farce is that the motion by PO was identical with the previous motion that
PiS first submitted (as the then opposition party) and subsequently withdrew (after becoming the majority party in
the newly elected Sejm).
VI.          Trading Shakespeare for Hitchcock
Right after the victorious election, PiS decided – through a coordinated action – to make a thinly veiled attempt
to subdue the Constitutional Tribunal. With the blatant support from Andrzej Duda, a former member of the PiS
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and Komorowski’s successor in the presidential office, the new incumbents traded Shakespeare for Hitchcock by
starting with an earthquake followed by rising tension. The developments took a sharp and rapid turn. PiS
withdrew their motion for review of the constitutionality of the Act passed by the old Sejm. Not that they would
suddenly change their minds with regard to the substance. But the circumstances changed and so did the
interests. In the disguise of a guardian of the Constitution, PiS pre-empted the ruling by the Tribunal and decided
to push forward the amendments to the Act not via the constitutional review by the Tribunal but rather via
legislative process controlled by themselves. The reason for which PiS wouldn’t now want to see a judgement on
(un)constitutionality of the “transitional” Article. 137 of the Act was straightforward: the draft law to amend the Act
was already being elaborated with a twin Article 137a. On November 13th, 2015 the new draft law amending the
controversial Act saw the light of day. The pertinent Article 137 was to be replaced by a mirror Article 137a. The
later provision was designed with a view to reopening the selection process and refilling the five seats in the
Tribunal, disregarding earlier selection by the old Sejm. The new law was adopted by the Sejm on November
19th, 2015, signed by President Duda on the following day (20.11.2015) and promulgated forthwith. Just to
remind: the same Duda hasn’t proved equally quick-reacting with taking oaths from the justices selected by the
old parliament, even though their term in office has already started to run. President Duda kept playing his
procrastination game until he eventually explicitly refused to swear in the five judges appointed by the old Sejm.
He argued that the appointment was based on an unconstitutional act – again putting himself into the shoes of
the Constitutional Tribunal.
VII.       The Tribunal’s self-defense and the twofold reincarnation of midnight
judges
On November 30 th, 2015 the Tribunal, sitting in full court[12], by unanimous vote, issued an injunction mandating
the Sejm to refrain from selecting or taking actions towards selection of any new judges until the Tribunal finally
decides the case on merits. The injunction was ordered with a view to prevent any developments that would
undermine the effectiveness of the pending constitutional review of the act. An unprecedented recourse to the
injunction[13] was received as a means of the Tribunal’s self-defense [14], yet it encountered spilt opinions[15].
Either way, the injunction manoeuvre, as the Tribunal’s ultima ratio, has soon proved toothless. The order
notwithstanding, the PiS controlled Sejm went unconcernedly on and late in the evening of December 2nd, 2015
selected five new justices – substitutes for the former replacement judges. In view of the blistering determination
of the majority it may be a mere subtlety to point to the fact that the “substitute” transitional Article 137a had not
yet entered into force at the time when the “substitute” replacement judges were hastily selected. For
Reconquista-obsessed majority a secondary issue at best. Immediately thereafter, before dawn on December
3rd, four of the five substitute-replacement judges were sworn in by President Duda[16]. The notorious “midnight
judges”, as the early 19th century eleventh hour appointments were referred to in the US[17], have in 21st
century’s Poland first reincarnated as the last-minute appointees of the old Sejm[18] and then reappeared in an
even more literal sense on the opposite end of the political argument as substitute-replacement judges selected
after the sunset and sworn-in before dawn.
VIII.     The Tribunal’s first judgement (3.12.2015, K 34/15) and the “Printer-is-the-
King”-obstruction
The following day, December 3rd, 2015, the Tribunal delivered a judgment on the constitutionality of i.a. the
incriminated transitional Article 137. In this regard – quoting from the English version of the official press release:
“[t]he Tribunal ruled that Article 137 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act is unconstitutional, insofar as the provision
made it possible for the Sejm, during its previous parliamentary term (2011-2015), to select two judges to the
Constitutional Tribunal in place of the two judges whose terms of office were to end respectively on 2 and 8
December 2015. By contrast, the provisions regulating the procedure for selecting three judges who had been
chosen to assume offices after the judges whose terms of office ended on 6 November 2015 were ruled to be
constitutional”[19]. With regard to the President’s refusal to take an oath from the legally selected judges, the
Tribunal held that the head of state was obligated to swear in the said justices forthwith. The Tribunal declared
any contrary interpretation unconstitutional, as it remains outside of the President’s powers to select judges to
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the Constitutional Tribunal and the sole competence thereto is vested by the Constitution with the Sejm. As the
judgment of December 3rd sets forth, “any potential doubts that the head of state may raise as to the
constitutionality of legal provisions on the basis of which judges have been selected to the Constitutional Tribunal
may only be addressed by the Constitutional Tribunal”[20].
The judgment, as clear as it may legitimately appear, did not in fact contribute to the settlement of the political
dispute but met with further obstruction by PiS-dominated Sejm and stirred some legal procedural doubts as
well. Even though the judgement shall be final, universally binding, and irrebuttable (Article 190 sec. 1 of the
Constitution), it only takes effect from the day of its publication (Article 190 sec. 3 of the Constitution), and the
publication shall be made forthwith (Article 190 sec. 2 of the Constitution). Since however the official gazette is
administrated by the government, and the immediacy requirement, as one speciously could argue, isn’t a bright-
line rule, the publication may theoretically be arbitrarily postponed. As absurd as this theoretical assumption may
appear, the practice has soon validated its premises: the government dared to refuse the publication and has
hence made the judgment virtually non-existent. Interestingly however, the government substantiated its refusal
by pointing to a formal deficiencies of the judgement: according to the Article 44(1)(f) of the Act on Constitutional
Tribunal, the Tribunal shall adjudicate in full bench if the case is of particular complexity or significance. Needless
to say, at least the latter undeniably holds true for the questions at stake. And it was the Chief Justice himself that
first ordained the case to be decided in full bench, as the statute prescribes. Only after it became evident that the
parties to the proceedings may request the recusal of the three judges who have previously been involved in the
legislative process (including Tribunal’s Chief Justice himself), the procedural order was amended so that the
case would be decided by a “default” panel of 5 judges. The amendment has not been duly substantiated, yet
the rationale behind it was obvious: an imminent threat of a deadlock in the Tribunal stemming from the former
involvement of three judges in the legislative process. Setting aside a valid legal point, namely the question, if a
pragmatic consideration (the Tribunal’s inability to adjudicate in full bench) could prevail over the statutory
formalities (the full bench requirement), one thing remains obvious: the ruling majority again attempted to pre-
empt the Tribunal’s exclusive power to finally resolve the pertinent constitutional issues. The government, by
abusing its auxiliary competence, or in fact its duty to act as an agent for the Tribunal with regard to a purely
technical matter, that being printing of the official gazette, endeavoured a superrevision of the judgment, without
having any constitutional basis therefor. For a third time in just few days the same pattern repeated itself: first the
president usurped the right to decide about the constitutionality of the selection by refusing to take the oath from
the judges appointed by the former Sejm, second the parliament pre-empted the Tribunal by changing the law it
opportunistically found unconstitutional in spite of a pending review process, and now, third, the government
refused to publish the Tribunal’s judgement on the grounds of its purported procedural irregularities. A sad spot
where the justices’ myopia (reckless involvement in the legislative process) meets the government’s
impertinence (harsh and unrestrained backfire). Eventually the government yielded and the judgment was
published on December 16th, 2015 – a long 2 weeks after the ruling. But it wasn’t until a new ace was ready to
come to play – a new amending act put forward by PiS on December 15th (cf. Section X infra).
IX.          The Tribunal’s second judgement (9.12.2015, K 35/15)
On November 9 th, the Tribunal ruled on the constitutionality of the amending Act of November 19 th, 2015, that
has been hastily pushed through by PiS and signed by the President just three weeks before. The amending Act
has been literally smashed by the Tribunal. The following amendments were held unconstitutional: (i) the
possibility of serving as the Tribunal’s Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice for two consecutive terms; (ii) the
provision, whereby the newly selected justices were to be sworn in by the President within 30 days after the
selection instead of being sworn in forthwith; (iii) the provision, whereby the judges’ term of office does not begin
until sworn-in by the President; (iv) the reversion of the appointment of the three judges as legally selected by
the former Sejm; (v) the annulment of the incumbent Tribunal’s Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice’ term in
office, i.e. their “downgrading” to a regular justice’s position or expiry of their presiding powers. Last but not least,
the Tribunal ruled unconstitutional the new substitute transitional Article 137a insofar as it concerns putting
forward a candidate for a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal to assume the office after the judge whose term of
office ended on 6 November 2015[21]. This confirms the legality of the appointment of the three (out of five)
replacement judges selected by the old Sejm, as ruled by the Tribunal in its first judgement of December 3rd,
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2015.
The judgement’s publication in the official gazette was again unduly postponed by the government and
eventually printed on December 18th, 2015.
 
X.            Driving the final nail in the coffin?
The time bought through playing with the delay in publication (boxing) was used by PiS to develop a new
manoeuvre (chess). Namely, on December 15th, 2015 a new draft amending law has been put forward by the
ruling party. Ironically the draft was heralded under the working title a “Repair Act on the Constitutional Tribunal”
as it was alleged to break out of the deadlock. In fact it contained a set of provisions to further entrap the Tribunal
and effectively paralyse it. The draft encountered wide criticism[22] for being both unconstitutional and ill-
designed. Notwithstanding the objections the majority party pushed the law through in a hasty process, curbing
the discussion and ignoring almost all corrections proposed by the opposition. Eventually the “Repair Act” has
been adopted by PiS in the night of December 22nd, 2015, against all other parties represented in Sejm. The
key provisions of the newly adopted “Repair Act” embrace[23]:
a broadening of the full bench requirement by a default provision stipulating that unless the Act provides
otherwise, the Tribunal adjudicates in full bench. This reverses the former approach whereby only in
cases specified by the law the Tribunal had to sit in full court. In practice, this may well jeopardise the
daily functioning of the Tribunal by making it incapable of handling future case-inflow;
raising the numbers of the full bench from 11/15 (now) to 13/15 (according to the “Repair Act”), whereby
the Tribunal becomes inoperative unless it immediately accepts the controversial and actually
delegitimized substitute-replacement judges selected by PiS and sworn-in by President Duda in
contravention of the Tribunal’s injunction of December 2nd (cf. Section VII supra) and subsequent rulings
of December 3rd and 9th (cf. Section VIII and Section VIII respectively);
imposing of a supermajority vote (two-third) requirement each time the Tribunal adjudicates in full bench –
in breach of Article 190 sec. 5 of the Constitution requiring just a majority (tacitly: a simple majority). The
supermajority requirement doesn’t arise accidentally as it nicely coincides with the new blocking stock PiS
will obtain in the Tribunal through their “midnight” appointees (substitute-replacement judges).
A part of the manoeuvre has been not to have any vacatio legis – the act shall become effective from the day of
its promulgation. This is to entrap the Tribunal in a vicious circle – the review of the new Act should be made in
accordance with this new Act and the Act makes such a review impossible. The only way out would be to refer
the Act to the Tribunal for constitutional review by President Duda before signing it (ex ante review). But will
President Duda this time around prove more loyal to the Constitution than to his former party? Alternatively, the
Tribunal may adjudicate based on the Constitution directly, paying no regard to the laws it finds unconstitutional
along the proceedings. But will the ruling majority accept the ruling and obey? After the chess round it has
always been boxing and they are the ones that have the punching power.
By the time of closing this article the newly adopted law has been referred for approval to the Senate – the upper
chamber of the Polish parliament – also PiS-dominated.
XI.          Conclusion and outlook
Undeniably, there is an unscrupulous political bout going on and the aggravating constitutional crisis is both a
result of the struggle and a means to prevail in the battle. The Socio-institutional underpinning of the crisis
should be seen in a poor constitutional culture among the leading political figures on both sides and in the
deepening Weltanschauung divide of the Polish society. Still, it wouldn’t give a proper account of the situation to
deny that other countries and other times have seen similar developments as well. Notably Hungary under the
Orbán administration has “successfully” marginalised the role of the Constitutional Court. In past centuries
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constitutional arguments were also eating away at American politics and society at large, recalling Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s lost clash with the Supreme Court[24] or the aforementioned “midnight judges” dispute over
outgoing president Adams’s appointments rendered ineffective by his successor in presidential office, Thomas
Jefferson[25]. The prestige of the Constitutional Court and its power to interfere with the government’s policies
make it tempting to do both – take the seats in the Court as one more political bounty[26] and to neutralise the
possible adverse effect of the Court’s independence on the government’s latitude in pursuing whatever policies
or attaining whatever goals the government may wish. In spite of these two alluring prospects, never before in
the nearly 30-years’ history of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal has any party dared a Court raid and any
attempted manoeuvres were widely condemned and consequently nipped in the bud[27]. What makes the
situation look different today? Why would the ruling Law & Justice party strive to reform, or actually incapacitate
the Constitutional Tribunal? How much thereof is attributable to an affect-driven political vengeance and how
much to a cool calculation? The “bull in a china shop”-like diplomacy speaks for the former, but it certainly is
more than just that. As Maciej Kisilewski convincingly points out, the weakening of Constitutional Tribunal may
well be a conscious attempt to pave the way for the implementation of the party’s social agenda. An analogy to
Roosevelt’s “court packing” is easy to discern. However, most of the promises made by PiS during the election
campaign fall within social policy and are thus to a considerable extent subject to sole discretionary powers of
the legislative and executive with little if any scope for judicial interference. But the reforming and reshuffling zeal
by the PiS leadership is not restrained to socio-economic issues as the first weeks of the new government
evidenced. As it was reportedly bluntly framed by an anonymous adviser to Polish President Duda “now begins
the process of reconquering the country, and it may be brutal”[28]. Media and civil service are among the first to
undergo far-reaching reorganisation. Given this broader scope, a development parallel to a Hungarian
“Orbánisation” does not seem a fully unrealistic prospect. And here we are back to democracy and to giving the
people what they want. The Budapest analogy[29] was not seen by the October’15 voters with dismay – many
appreciate Orbán’s uncompromising foreign policy and valiant domestic reforms. But soon PiS will arrive at a
check-point: do they deliver what they promised in the run-up to their electoral victories, first presidential in May
and then parliamentary in October 2015? No excuses accepted. And, putting aside the morals and aesthetics of
the party’s obdurate attitude towards the Constitutional Tribunal, let alone its legality, will this headstrong stance
prove in any way effective if measured by the degree of attaining of underlying policy objectives? Putting it
differently: will the Tribunal now turn more lenient towards the legislation produced by the ruling party? Even if
PiS proves eventually successful with installing its “own” five judges, which is still an unsettled issue, the
remaining majority may – as political analysts suggest[30] – humanly turn hostile towards a party that is blamed
for the coup. This subtle yet highly important issue could have been handled with a much more diplomatic touch.
Unfortunately for the Tribunal and for themselves, the new ruling party PiS, instead of demonstrating adherence
to the rule of law and searching for a compromise, decided to simply seek revenge for earlier irregularities by
Platforma, and attempt to subdue and eventually downgrade the Constitutional Tribunal, something that Poland
has not experienced in the last 30 years, since the establishment of the Court. And this certainly is deeply
troubling. So we are now watching a sort of chess-boxing, a hybrid game consisting of rounds in chess and
boxing, where the parties attempt to outsmart the opponent and if this doesn’t help, they simply punch.
Contravention of the division of powers and disregard for the idea of limited government has repeatedly been
perpetrated by the ruling party Law & Justice and “their” President Duda. It remains to be seen if the attempts
made are understood by the perpetrators as a tool to facilitate party’s short-term objectives or as an ultimate
goal to redesign Poland’s institutional order. For the latter it needs to be recalled that although PiS’s electoral
victory remains undisputed and gives the party a democratic legitimacy to pushing forward their reform agenda,
the majority won by PiS is not a “constitutional majority” meaning a supermajority granting the power to amend
the Constitution and the institutional order resting thereon. And here justice needs to be given to Orbán’s Fidesz
– who unlike PiS in Poland – democratically won the supermajority needed to revise Hungarian Constitution. In
spite of falling short of obtaining a supermajority, Kaczyński’s party now attempts to get there through dubious
by-passes trampling the rule of law and spoiling political and constitutional culture. But it is still more complex
than just to say that the incumbents strive for the marginalisation of the Constitutional Tribunal. It equally appears
to make a part of an attempted redefinition of elites and societal structure of post-socialist Poland, as defined by
the renowned Round Table Talks and accompanying negotiations that led to a bloodless transformation started in
1989.
In my view, the intensity and the nature of the crisis make it necessary to break a spell cast on the Tribunal. And
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it is not just about the pragmatics, meaning the legal framework and the unsettled appointments controversy. It is
equally the symbolic power of the Tribunal that is at stake. Like it or not, the Tribunal has been severely hit and
“desacralized”. The popular esteem enjoyed by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, even if lesser in comparison
with the American Supreme Court or the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, is still remarkably high, which
becomes even more evident if account is taken of a positive gap in public confidence in the Constitutional Court
over the trust in general judiciary – a gap much wider in Poland than in Germany or the US, where the
confidence in the justice system as such does not fall that much behind the one in the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht or the U.S. Supreme Court[31]. And even I am far from idealising the quality of the
past jurisprudence of the Polish Tribunal, I do believe, the symbolic dimension of the Court is a value in itself[32].
Only a model legislative process, fully transparent and under the involvement of civic society and academia, with
their voices being heard, could remedy the situation and help with restoring public confidence in the rule of law
and strengthen the legitimacy of the Tribunal after the loss in reputation suffered from the recent turmoil.
Paradoxically the fact that all the parties to the dispute are to blame at least for a part of the collapse, this not to
exclude the Tribunal itself, may be seen as a premise upon which a future cross-party compromise may be
based. But this is unlikely to happen without a durable pressure from the public and without the involvement of
civil society organisations taking an unpartisan stance and fighting for the cause, and not for politics. The
politicising of the current bottom-up civic resistance and attempts to take over the movement by active political
leaders will only aggravate the divide. Developments of recent days have shown that the people of Poland are
willing to go out on streets if justice dies. But they should not side with the former assassins. What is needed is a
cross-party understanding based upon constitutional values, not just interests.
The author would like to thank Dr. Marek Porzycki, Adv. Rafał Kos, Dr. Wojciech Rogowski and Prof. Charles
Szymanski for discussion and their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. All expressed views are
authors’ own, so are any errors and omissions. The author may be contacted at radwan@allerhand.pl .
[1] Cf. the documents and video-recordings of Committee’s and Subcommittees’ sittings 2013-2015 available at
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/SQL2.nsf/poskomprocall?OpenAgent&7&1590, in particular the report of May 12 th, 2015
of the special Subcommittee concerning the draft Act on the Constitutional Tribunal available at
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Zapisy7.nsf/wgskrnr/SPC-236 (in Polish).
[2] Citizens Network Watchdog Poland – cf. the coverage of the inquiry and the follow-up court proceedings
available at http://informacjapubliczna.org.pl/11,905,trybunal_konstytucyjny_tez_musi_byc_transparentny.html
(in Polish).
[3] Cf. the ruling by the Supreme Administrative Court of 10 January 2014 (I OSK 2213/13).
[4] Cf. the coverage
http://informacjapubliczna.org.pl/11,1032,rozprawa_o_jawne_kwoty_w_umowach_trybunalu_konstytucyjnego.ht
ml (in Polish).
[5] Cf. the ruling by the Warsaw Administrative Court of December 4 th, 2015 (II SA/Wa 1510/15).
[6] Cf. the speech by R. Kropiwnicki, Member of Sejm (PO), the shorthand report (stenographic record) of the
sitting of Sejm on May 27th, 2015, available at .
http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/8860C47B75D03EBEC1257E520073E10F/%24File/93_b_ksiazka.pdf
at p. 167 (in Polish).
[7] Cf. the speech by W. Szarama, Member of Sejm (PiS), the shorthand report (stenographic record) of the
sitting of Sejm on May 27th, 2015, available at
http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoInter7.nsf/0/8860C47B75D03EBEC1257E520073E10F/%24File/93_b_ksiazka.pdf
at p. 168.
[8] Ibidem..
[9] Cf. supra, fn 1.
17/19
[10] Three vacancies opened on November 7th, one on December 3rd and one on December 9 th, 2015, with
retiring justices stepping down a day before the respective dates.
[11] According to the Article 98 of the Polish Constitution “ The term of office of the Sejm and Senate shall begin
on the day on which the Sejm assembles for its first sitting and shall continue until the day preceding the
assembly of the Sejm of the succeeding term of office”.
[12] I.e. under involvement of all 11 justices enjoying undisputed mandate at the date of adjudicating.
[13] Cf. the opposite position as expressed in the Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of February 22nd, 2006
(K 4/06); Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of October 24th, 2001 (SK 28/01).
[14] Cf. T. Koncewicz, Bruised, but not dead (yet): The Polish Constitutional Court has spoken, VerfBlog,
2015/12/10, http://verfassungsblog.de/en/bruised-but-not-dead-yet-the-polish-constitutional-court-has-spoken/
[15] Cf. M. Gutowski, P. Kardas, W trybie zabezpieczenia nie buduje się państwa prawa, Dziennik Gazeta
Prawna of December 3rd, 2015 (in Polish).
[16] The fifth substitute-replacement judge was sworn in on December 9 th, 2015, i.e. immediately after the last
2015 vacancy opened.
[17] U.S. Supreme Court: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 137 137 (1803).
[18] The analogy to Jefferson’s obstructive strategy was rightly discerned by A. Śledzińska-Simon – cf. A.
Śledzińska-Simon, Midnight Judges: Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal Caught Between Political Fronts, VerfBlog,
2015/11/23, http://verfassungsblog.de/midnight-judges-polands-constitutional-tribunal-caught-between-political-
fronts/.
[19] Cf. http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/news/press-releases/after-the-hearing/art/8749-ustawa-o-trybunale-
konstytucyjnym/.
[20] Ibidem.
[21] Cf. Tribunal’s official press release after the hearing on December 9 th, 2015 (in English)
http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/news/press-releases/after-the-hearing/art/8793-nowelizacja-ustawy-o-trybunale-
konstytucyjnym/. For more elaborate presentation of the judgement refer to T. Koncewicz, Bruised, but not dead
(yet): The Polish Constitutional Court has spoken, VerfBlog, 2015/12/10, http://verfassungsblog.de/en/bruised-
but-not-dead-yet-the-polish-constitutional-court-has-spoken/.
[22] Damning assessment was expressed i.a. by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, National Council of the
Judiciary of Poland, Polish Bar Council, and numerous NGOs and civic society organisations.
[23] Cf. the more elaborate account of the draft “Repair Act” by T. Koncewicz, “Court-packing” in Warsaw: The
Plot Thickens, VerfBlog, 2015/12/18, http://verfassungsblog.de/en/court-packing-in-warsaw-the-plot-thickens/ .
[24] The 1937 “court packing” prepared by Roosevelt administration embraced a highly controversial plan to
increase the number of Supreme Court judges from 9 to 15, allegedly to make it more efficient. The attempted
manoeuvre was designed to water down the Court’s anticipated hostility towards Roosevelt’s regulatory agenda,
that to the president’s dismay, could put the New Deal in jeopardy. In spite of his vast popularity, Roosevelt’s
assault on the Supreme Court failed following massive resistance by voters and fierce opposition even among
his Democratic congressmen – cf. B.A. Perry, H.J. Abraham, Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court. A New
Deal and a New Image [in:] S.K. Shaw, W.D. Pederson, M.R Williams (eds.), Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
Transformation of the Supreme Court, Routledge 2015.
[25] Cf. supra, Section VII.
[26] T. Koncewicz calls is a “business as usual”-approach – cf. T. Koncewicz, Polish Constitutional Drama: Of
18/19
Courts, Democracy, Constitutional Shenanigans and Constitutional Self-Defense, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Dec. 6,
2015, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/12/polish-constitutional-drama-of-courts-democracy-constitutional-
shenanigans-and-constitutional-self-defense .
[27] Cf. an concise retrospective by T. Żukowski, Zasady i pokusy, Rzeczpospolita of December 2nd, 2015, p. Ab
(in Polish).
[28] I quote from http://www.politico.eu/article/poland-pis-politics-kaczynski-tusk/ .
[29] PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński has repeatedly praised Budapest’s internal and external policies. Exemplary
for this stance is famous passage from Kaczyński’s 2011 speach: “the day will come when we will have
Budapest in Warsaw”.
[30] J. Sokołowski, Wojna pozycyjna wokół Trybunału, http://jagiellonski24.pl/2015/12/09/wojna-pozycyjna-
wokol-trybunalu/ (in Polish).
[31] Sources – for Poland (CBOS): http://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2014/K_131_14.PDF ; for United States
(GALLUP): http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx ; http://www.gallup.com/poll/185528/trust-
judicial-branch-sinks-new-low.aspx ; for Germany (statista):
http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/176867/umfrage/vertrauen-in-das-bundesverfassungsgericht/ ;
http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/153813/umfrage/allgemeines-vertrauen-in-die-justiz-und-das-
rechtssystem/ .
[32] T. Warczok, H. Dębska, Sacred Law and Profane Politics. The Symbolic Construction of the Constitutional
Tribunal, Polish Sociological Review, 4 (188)/2014.
LICENSED UNDER CC BY NC ND
SUGGESTED CITATION  Radwan, Arkadiusz: Chess-boxing around the Rule of Law: Polish Constitutionalism at
Trial, VerfBlog, 2015/12/23, http://verfassungsblog.de/?p=18624.
19/19
